Financial Innovation and Flexible Regulation: Destabilizing the Regulatory State by Ford, Cristie
The Peter A. Allard School of Law 
Allard Research Commons 
Faculty Publications Faculty Publications 
2014 
Financial Innovation and Flexible Regulation: Destabilizing the 
Regulatory State 
Cristie Ford 
Allard School of Law at the University of British Columbia, ford@allard.ubc.ca 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.allard.ubc.ca/fac_pubs 
 Part of the Securities Law Commons 
Citation Details 
Cristie Ford, "Financial Innovation and Flexible Regulation: Destabilizing the Regulatory State" 
([forthcoming in 2014]) 18 NC Banking Inst J 27. 
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Allard Research 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Allard 
Research Commons. For more information, please contact petrovic@allard.ubc.ca, elim.wong@ubc.ca. 
13-FORD   (DO NOT DELETE) 1/15/2014 12:12 PM 
 
FINANCIAL INNOVATION AND FLEXIBLE 
REGULATION: DESTABILIZING THE 
REGULATORY STATE 
BY CRISTIE FORD* 
Cristie Ford examines the regulatory failures leading up to the 
financial crisis, the rise of “flexible regulation,” the effects of financial 
innovation on regulation, and three different case studies that 
illuminate the drastic effects of that innovation: the Basel II banking 
regulations, the Canadian Asset-Backed Commercial Paper market, and 
the process for writing the Volcker Rule.  Finally, Ford examines the 
underlying assumptions that should be re-examined in order to create 
more effective regulatory policies. 
 
I write in the fields of securities and financial regulation, but I 
am primarily a scholar of regulation and governance. For the last few 
years I have been trying to take stock of the zeitgeist not only in 
finance, but also in regulation.  
I do not let financial institutions off the hook for their own 
egregiously bad conduct in the era leading up to the financial crisis, and 
I do not mean to underplay the direct causal link between that poor 
conduct and the crisis itself. However, my focus here is on the 
regulatory failures and gaps that also existed in the time leading up to 
the financial crisis. In our post-mortem analyses of pre-crisis regulation, 
there has been a lot of talk about the impact of market fundamentalism 
on financial regulation; about overreliance on the efficient market 
theory; and about excessive adherence to Hayekian political 
philosophy,1 which asserts that information is always decentralized and 
therefore no central regulator (unless it is part of a totalitarian state) 
could possibly have enough information to actually regulate well. I 
think all of these are important factors, which materially contributed to 
substantial deregulation both nationally and internationally in the lead-
 
* Associate Professor of Law, University of British Columbia. 
1.  See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944) (arguing that adherence to 
classical economic liberalism and minimal government interference are the best safeguards 
against tyranny). 
13-FORD  (DO NOT DELETE) 1/15/2014  12:12 PM 
28 NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE [Vol. 18 
up to the crisis. Along with these factors, those years also saw 
regulators bend to intense pressure to reduce the so-called “regulatory 
burden” in light of transnational competition for capital markets 
business. David Skeel’s argument that financial regulation in this era 
was corporatist — that it was premised on a problematic sort of elite 
partnership between government and financial institutions — is also 
persuasive.2 
Yet some of the things that were wrong with regulation, roughly 
between the fall of Enron in 2002 and the height of the financial crisis 
in fall 2008, were also of a different nature. I think it is clear that market 
fundamentalism, regulatory competition and neo-Hayekian thinking 
contributed to an erosion of regulation, but there were also a lot of 
progressive, non-Hayekian regulatory scholars who were advocating 
new forms of regulation in this era. Generally speaking, their 
prescriptions also accorded substantially more freedom to private actors 
than had been the case previously. I want to think about why that was 
the case. 
Scholarship on regulation and governance exploded, and 
changed, starting in the early 1990s. This was the post-Thatcher, post-
Reagan era of Al Gore’s Reinventing Government initiative, Tony 
Blair’s Third Way, and important new scholarly contributions like Ian 
Ayres’s and John Braithwaite’s 1992 book, Responsive Regulation.3 An 
increasingly sophisticated regulatory tool kit emerged transnationally, 
which continued to evolve through the early years of this millennium 
and which evolves today. In securities regulation, the conversation took 
the form of a debate about the relative merits of “rules based” and 
“principles based” regulatory strategies. In the United States, there was 
a lot of interest in the distinction following the fall of Enron (sometimes 
blamed on overly bright line, rules-based accounting standards) and the 
rise of London as a financial center (sometimes attributed to its more 
principles-based regulatory approach). The rules-versus-principles 
conversation, along with a separate conversation about corporate social 
responsibility and ways to enlist corporate actors into the service of 
broader social norms, can be understood as contextual examples of a 
 
2.  DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE DODD-FRANK ACT 
AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES (2010). 
3.  IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE 
DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992). 
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broader trend in scholarship and policy making toward what I call 
“flexible regulation.” 
Regulatory scholarship is a big tent. At the same time, a move 
toward more flexible regulation has been discernible across topic areas 
over the last two decades or so. Flexible regulation comes in different 
varieties too, but one commonality is a new emphasis on regulatory 
sensitivity to, and tailoring to, context. The idea is that it is possible to 
move away from one-size-fits-all, prescriptive regulation toward an 
approach that is more context sensitive, pragmatic, and data-driven. 
Flexible regulation also aims to be better at recognizing and leveraging 
other compliance-enhancing forces in society. It treats different 
regulated entities differently: it collaborates with private actors where 
possible and accords them a great deal of freedom to comply with 
regulatory goals as they see fit, but it ratchets up the oversight on non-
cooperative actors. It pulls in non-state actors. It tends to accept that 
state regulators do not always have the same access to or quality of 
information as regulated actors, which is one reason that it tries to “steer 
not row” or (using another phrase) to “regulate at a distance.” It tends to 
be permeable and interactive, not top-down and directive. As a result, 
the idea is that flexible regulation can reach out to and incorporate 
community norms, individual morality, market forces, market or media 
pressure, and any other forces that can help strengthen the arm of 
regulation. 
In addition, I would argue that flexible regulation is 
characterized by a notion that regulation ought to be dynamic and 
iterative. The idea is that regulation should be able to learn from its own 
experience, and modify its own behavior in light of that learning. Under 
the broad flexible regulation umbrella are some approaches, like meta-
regulation, management-based regulation, or safety case regulation, that 
especially embrace contingency and a learning-by-doing approach. 
Meta-regulation is the term used by Christine Parker, an Australian 
scholar, to describe her “triple loop learning” approach to corporate 
governance and corporate social responsibility.4 Management-based 
regulation is David Lazer’s and Cary Coglianese’s term to describe a 
similar approach across several regulatory sectors in the United States, 
which “directs regulated organizations to engage in a planning process 
 
4.  CHRISTINE PARKER, THE OPEN CORPORATION: SELF-REGULATION & CORPORATE 
CITIZENSHIP (2000). 
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that aims toward the achievement of public goals, offering firms 
flexibility in how they achieve public goals.”5 Some of the work I have 
done on principles-based securities regulation is probably analogous.6 
The claim is that, rather than trying to manage the details in a particular 
regulated entity, regulators should be able to approach their task at a 
systems level. Compliance systems and industry conditions are in a 
constant state of flux, so the trick for regulators is to focus on the meta-
level — on how well regulated entities manage themselves, learn from 
experience, and respond to new challenges. This focus also frees the 
regulator from having to worry about the compliance details within any 
particular regulated entity, though the regulator will still have to be able 
to make good judgments at the meta-level. Christine Parker calls this 
the “regulation of self-regulation.”7 
For example, a financial regulator should be able to assess the 
quality of the internal compliance and risk management mechanisms 
that a financial institution has in place. The regulator would assess 
whether or not the firm has in place effective policies and procedures to 
detect and prevent internal violations of law, and to model and then 
mitigate the risks it is running in the course of its business. So long as 
the regulator can identify what a good compliance system looks like and 
determine whether the firm has one, and so long as the firm’s 
compliance outcomes fall within a range of permissible outcomes, 
broadly defined, then the firm should be able to regulate itself within 
those bounds. It should be able to devise its own systems — its own 
processes for meeting the prescribed regulatory goals — with the 
benefit of its fine-grained understanding of its own business. 
This “regulation of self-regulation” approach was a 
characteristic of some important regulatory initiatives in financial 
regulation in the pre-crisis era. In fact, quite a lot of rhetoric at the time 
suggested that more meta-regulatory, principles-based methods had the 
potential to improve regulatory performance along all matrices at once. 
This was not just a deregulatory or market fundamentalist project — it 
was far more broad-based than that. For example, John Tiner, CEO of 
 
5.  Coglianese & Lazer, Management-Based Regulation, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV 691, 
691 (2003). 
6.  Cristie Ford, Principles-Based Securities Regulation in the Wake of the Global 
Financial Crisis, 55 MCGILL L. J. 257 (2010). 
7.  PARKER, supra note 4. 
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the U.K. Financial Services Authority during this era, said in 2006 that 
principles-based regulation could produce simply “better” regulation, 
which would mean simultaneously “(1) a stronger probability of 
statutory outcomes being secured, (2) a lower cost, and (3) more 
stimulus to competition and innovation all at once.”8 (Note the 
reference to stimulating innovation.) This was part of what was going 
on in this time period. 
Tiner’s quote points to another way to understand our regulatory 
choices in this time period, which really derives from the new 
regulatory drive to be dynamic and context-sensitive, and to pull private 
actors’ own contextual knowledge into the regulatory process. An 
important but under-examined factor is the relationship between 
regulation and the phenomenon of private sector innovation. Flexible 
regulation is built to function in the midst of constant change. Pulling in 
contextual information from firms’ matters because that information is 
complex and constantly changing. Firms’ internal compliance strategies 
are of interest to regulators because firms know more about their fast-
moving businesses than regulators ever could. Regulators are seeking to 
link to firms’ internal compliance mechanisms, which in turn are trying 
to keep up with business risks — and in financial firms, those business 
risks were very often the constantly shifting byproduct of fast-moving 
financial innovation. So, without consciously trying to, some regulatory 
regimes of the meta-regulatory variety ultimately lost any purchase 
from which to question private actors’ for-profit innovations, and even 
ended up embedding them into their very regulatory processes and 
standards in an effort to create regulatory architecture that could channel 
and keep up with that innovation. 
In finance, the particular form of private sector innovation I’m 
interested in really has to do with the disaggregation and recombination 
of what were formerly tightly bundled bits of property, and therefore 
risk. While flexible regulation appreciated the need to keep up with a 
changing field, what it did not appreciate was just how profoundly 
destabilizing that degree of innovation would be for regulation itself. It 
 
8.   John Tiner, Chief Executive, FSA, Speech at the SII Annual Conference: Better 
Regulation: Objective or Oxymoron (May 9, 2006), available at 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/Speeches/2006/0509_jt.shtml; see also 
Clive Briault, Managing Director, Retail Markets, FSA, Speech at ABI 2007 Conference: 
Principles-Based Regulation — Moving from Theory to Practice (May 10, 2007), available at 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/Speeches/2007/0510_cb.shtml. 
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was destabilizing to the boundaries of regulatory arenas and 
destabilizing to some of the assumptions that underpinned regulatory 
regimes.  
In this talk, I point briefly to the Basel II Accords around capital 
adequacy as an example of a meta-regulatory regime that embraced 
private sector innovation and private ordering around it, without 
appreciating how destabilizing that innovation actually was. A second 
category of regulatory approaches to innovation are those that attempt 
to establish boundaries and preconditions to innovation through a series 
of parameters on the scope of the market. These strategies assume that 
innovation can be contained, and that within pre-set boundaries the 
market can be counted on to produce predictable and manageable sorts 
of innovation outcomes. This is mistaken too. In this second category 
would fall the securities law regime around asset-backed commercial 
paper (“ABCP”) in Canada, and there are similar mechanisms in the 
United States. A third category would include older regulatory 
structures that do not actually try to respond to the impact of innovation 
in the same conscious way, but nevertheless are affected by it. Notice 
and comment rulemaking under the U.S. Administrative Procedure Act, 
particularly around the so-called Volcker Rule, is my example here.  
I use the term “innovation framing regulation” to try to 
foreground the relationship between regulatory structure and private 
sector innovation. This helps demonstrate that the failure to appreciate 
the nature and significance of privately generated innovation, within the 
regulatory regimes designed to work with that innovation, was really an 
important factor in regulatory failure leading up to the financial crisis. 
Structures like the Basel II capital adequacy regime were premised on 
the conviction that private sector innovation was inevitably and 
appropriately going to be fast-moving and complex, so that regulators 
only needed to steer (not row), and to channel this fast moving force at 
the systems level, without actually having to understand it in any 
detailed way. 
Thinking about regulation in terms of its innovation framing 
qualities also allows us to question the sense, within regulation and 
regulatory scholarship, that it is actually possible through regulatory 
technique to channel and harness private sector innovation in public 
welfare-enhancing directions — to tweak incentives here and bring in 
private standards there, and thereby build a system that will generate 
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predictable, positive outcomes out of industry-driven change. I think 
there was considerable overconfidence about the capacity of good meta-
level regulatory design to achieve “simply better” results in all 
directions, and inattention to the broader context in which regulation 
was located. There was also a crucial failure to recognize the feedback 
loop between regulatory structure and private sector innovation itself. 
Innovation and regulation are in a reflexive relationship. Regulation 
constitutes its environment, its regulatory field, the market. If you 
constitute an environment based on the sense that private sector 
innovation will inevitably be a fast moving, complex, fundamentally 
beneficial thing, and that all that regulators really need to do is to try not 
to fall too far behind or get in the way, then you will have an 
environment in which innovation will have a license to accelerate and 
regulators will not have a principled basis on which to challenge it. 
Bourdieu and other scholars of power would point to the 
influence of a form of large-scale cognitive capture in this story.9 There 
is a broader, contemporary social and political conversation that really 
sees innovation as ultimately beneficial, supremely important, and not 
something that regulation should be obstructing. Whether we think of it 
as capture or not, a pro-innovation worldview affected many of the 
regulatory structures we are looking at in this time — whether they 
were consciously innovation-framing, like Basel II, or whether they 
were operating in the context of a broader political conversation around 
the Volcker Rule. What that background pro-innovation consensus did 
in the Volcker Rule context was to limit the political conversation at the 
level of the legislative process, but it also meant that the conversation at 
the level of the regulator would inevitably take place in highly technical 
terms, which were not accessible to members of the public that wanted 
to participate. The standard concerns that everybody has about public 
input in the notice and comment rulemaking function are only 
exacerbated when you are trying to have that conversation around 
highly technical details, like those surrounding the Volcker Rule and its 
implementation. I suggest that there has been a general failure to have 
an important normative conversation about the trade-offs we are 
making, when we put innovation in front and center among our 
priorities. In my view it is unrealistic to think that we can transcend 
 
9.  PIERRE BOURDIEU & LOÏC J.D. WACQUANT, AN INVITATION TO REFLEXIVE 
SOCIOLOGY (1992). 
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some of the difficult, normatively contested issues that underlie 
financial regulation just through better regulatory technique. 
Basel II is my specific example of a meta-regulatory structure.10 
Basel II incorporates clear meta-regulatory elements and typifies the 
outcome-oriented, principles-based turn that financial regulation took 
between about 2002 and 2008. Basel II tried to improve on Basel I 
through its three pillar strategy. Pillar 1 imposed a minimal capital 
requirement. Pillar 2 provided for financial institution supervision by 
national bank supervisors, and Pillar 3 imposed enhanced disclosure 
requirements. The idea behind Pillar 3 was to try to activate market 
forces to buttress the capital adequacy requirements, on the assumption 
that better-informed market participants would decide whether or not to 
buy your product. Under Pillar 1, the largest financial institutions were 
allowed to use a so-called “advanced approach” to capital adequacy. 
Essentially they were allowed, within limits, to use their internal, 
proprietary risk modeling software to assess the risks associated with 
the products they were carrying and marketing, and therefore to 
determine for themselves how much capital they had to keep on hand. 
Of course, as it turned out, this promoted a behavioral cascade toward 
excessive risk taking, which was exacerbated by the failure of proper 
supervision by some national regulators under Pillar 2. The Pillar 3 
market discipline idea did not work either. Disclosure does not work if, 
in spite of the disclosure, market participants cannot understand the 
product, and disclosure does not work well during a bubble. The failure 
of all three of those Pillars really could be understood, in part, as a 
function of the unanticipated disruptive impact of private sector 
innovation on a structure designed to deal with it. 
The summer 2007 ABCP crisis in Canada11 was not globally 
significant in terms of impact, but it is an interesting regulatory case 
study to illustrate a second category of innovation framing regulatory 
strategy. The ABCP crisis in Canada foreshadowed some of the 
financial crisis events that happened later, and it was similar in nature. 
Commercial paper is a short term (less than 270 days), unsecured IOU. 
 
10.  See THE BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, www.bis.org (last visited Oct. 
11, 2013). 
11.  See John Chant, The ABCP Crisis in Canada: The Implications for the Regulation 
of Financial Markets, A Research Study Prepared For the Expert Panel on Securities 
Regulation, http://www.expertpanel.ca/documents/research-
studies/The%20ABCP%20Crisis%20in%20Canada%20-%20Chant.English.pdf. 
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“Asset backed” commercial paper is commercial paper secured by an 
underlying asset. Under Canadian securities laws, commercial paper 
could be sold under an exemption from the normal disclosure 
obligations associated with securities regulation, on the belief that it was 
extremely safe.12 There were four reasons it was assumed to be safe. 
The first was that it was assumed that no rational investor would buy 
commercial paper, that is, basically an unsecured IOU, from anything 
other than a reputable organization. There would be no market for 
commercial paper issued by some fly-by-night entity. Thus, the 
marketability of the product itself was an indication of its safety. As 
well, commercial paper matures after only 270 days. The likelihood that 
a reputable organization would suffer some kind of default event within 
270 days would be minimal. Third, the commercial paper had to receive 
an approved rating from an approved credit rating agency, which would 
vouch for its soundness. Finally, like the products sold in the rest of the 
exempt market, the idea was that commercial paper would only be sold 
to sophisticated investors who did not need the disclosure the securities 
regulation regime would otherwise provide. 
Each of those assumptions proved to be flawed, and I argue that 
they were flawed largely as a function of the impact of innovation. First, 
the fact that ABCP was marketable bore no relationship to its safety as 
an investment. ABCP was actually issued by conduits that had been 
created by banks, and the banks used those conduits to move long-term 
credit obligations off their own balance sheets. So, there was no 
relationship there (at least on paper, and before reputational forces 
kicked in). You were not actually buying blue chip stock from the Royal 
Bank of Canada. It was highly marketable, especially internationally, 
primarily because it offered a better return than a lot of other 
investments did. Second, the short 270 day window was irrelevant 
because the entire ABCP market was constantly being rolled over. 
Maturing ABCP was paid out using new ABCP. It operated like a short-
term credit facility. ABCP was only going to be a meaningful 
instrument so long as it could continually be rolled over. What 
happened in the ABCP crisis was that parties became nervous about the 
 
12.  See Paula Toovey & John Kiff, Developments and Issues In The Canadian Market for 
Asset-Backed Commercial Paper, THE FIN. SYS. REVIEW (2012), 
http://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/fsr-0603-toovey.pdf. 
 
13-FORD  (DO NOT DELETE) 1/15/2014  12:12 PM 
36 NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE [Vol. 18 
assets underlying some ABCP, and particularly about whether some 
Canadian ABCP was exposed to U.S. subprime mortgage debt. It 
became harder to roll ABCP over and ultimately the market froze 
completely. So the 270 day window was not a meaningful timeframe. 
Third, credit rating agencies were not effective assessors of product 
quality.13 Finally, purchasers of ABCP were not always sophisticated 
investors. A lot of retail investors owned ABCP as part of managed 
portfolios. Each of these fundamental assumptions about the asset-
backed commercial paper market was undermined as a function of the 
kind of smashing of the atom of property that was effected by private 
sector innovation around derivatives and securitization. 
Regarding the Volcker Rule in the United States, I rely 
substantially on Kim Krawiec’s wonderful piece, Don’t “Screw Joe the 
Plummer [sic]”: The Sausage-Making of Financial Reform.14 What I 
argue, extrapolating from her account, is that there was no possibility of 
having a really meaningful conversation at the political level around 
limiting private sector innovation in finance. As a result, the Volcker 
Rule and decisions about how it would be implemented fell to the 
regulators. This turned it into a highly technical conversation. Krawiec’s 
work does a wonderful job of cataloging and analyzing the thousands of 
letters written by members of the public to the FSOC and other 
regulators around the Volcker Rule. Largely, these letters from the 
public made emotional or political pleas — they said things like “don’t 
screw Joe the plummer” — meanwhile, financial industry members 
were having one-on-one meetings with top regulators, writing cogent 
letters about technical matters, and providing the kind of input that 
could actually move the needle in terms of how the rule would be 
implemented.  
These three examples suggest three misperceptions around the 
impact of innovation and regulation that deserve more attention. While 
obviously each of these case studies is different, in each one the 
regulatory regime exhibits a lack of understanding about the 
phenomenon of innovation that it is grappling with.  
The first assumption we need to examine is that the role of 
 
13.  Although in Canada, a Canadian credit rating agency blew the whistle and hastened 
the crisis. 
14.  Kimberly D. Krawiec, Don’t “Screw Joe the Plummer”: The Sausage-Making of 
Financial Reform, 55 ARIZ. L. R. 55-103 (2013).  
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regulators is simply to get out of the way of fast moving, complex 
financial innovation, which (as the U.K.’s Turner Review suggested) is 
assumed to be beneficial virtually by definition.15 Whether regulators 
are trying to get out of the way through high level meta-regulatory 
architecture (as with Basel II) or by ceding the field to the market (as 
with the ABCP regime), a consequential underlying idea was that 
regulators needed to regulate from a greater distance to account for the 
beneficial, unstoppable, massively complex force of innovation that was 
operating. This enforced humility on the part of regulators (or was it 
complacency about the rationality and wisdom of markets and market 
actors, and optimism about regulatory technique?) really meant that in 
the run-up to the financial crisis, private sector bankers’ quantitative 
skills were understood to be more central than larger policy 
conversations. This left broader social questions about the nature and 
implications of innovation — who is innovating? for what purposes? 
with what larger consequences? — substantially insulated from 
interrogation. The perception that financial innovation was going to be 
beneficial overall meant that it was virtually impossible for regulators to 
articulate concerns, or even to have concerns, about, for example, the 
growth of the over-the-counter derivatives market. They no longer 
considered it their role to ask these sorts of broader, normative 
questions. This regulatory stance, while not intentionally deregulatory, 
prohibited proper examination of the kinds of varieties of innovations 
and the purposes they served. I would suggest, as well, that though the 
default assumption that financial innovation is beneficial has been 
challenged since the financial crisis, as scholars of regulation we have 
still not undertaken the kind of careful inquiry into the nature of 
innovation that is needed, if we are to design more effective regulation 
going forward. 
The second assumption challenged by these three narratives is 
that the regulatory moment is the crucial one. Of course I think 
regulatory structure matters or I would not be a scholar of regulation, 
but we may also need to broaden our view to include the moments 
before and behind the regulatory moment, where the atom of property is 
being smashed through financial innovation, as well as developments 
after the highest-profile regulatory moments as demonstrated, for 
 
15.  Fin. Servs. Auth., The Turner Review: A regulatory response to the global banking 
crisis (Mar. 2009), http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turner_review.pdf. 
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example, in the Volcker Rule rulemaking process. At this later stage we 
need to ask ourselves who is still in the room in the subsequent 
moments where the fundamental details of rule implementation actually 
get determined? Focusing only on the formal regulatory moment misses 
the broader temporal landscape that affects regulators’ scope for action 
at that point, and beyond.  
Third, we need to question the assumption that regulation 
somehow sits outside innovation and is not directly implicated by it. It 
is not the case that we can design elegant regulatory architecture that 
will be impervious to the highly destabilizing forces of innovation on 
the ground. The reflexive relationship between innovation framing 
regulatory architecture, and innovation, is significant and demands more 
study. I am not saying that we should return to bright line, old style, top 
down, traditional rulemaking on a large scale. Innovation has shown 
itself to be very adept at getting around bright line rules, which is one of 
the reasons that flexible and principles-based regulation emerged in the 
first place. There is no putting the genie back in the bottle now. At the 
same time, we need to appreciate how disruptive innovation can be to 
regulation, and in particular how it can pry open unexpected spaces 
within a regulatory regime, through which some parties’ interests are 
advanced at the expense of others. 
At a technical level, effective regulation of private sector 
innovation requires a clearer and more nuanced understanding of 
innovation than it currently has — a better sense of how and for whose 
purposes innovation develops; and of what effects innovation might 
have on regulation itself. However, we should not imagine that there 
will be some magical step change in regulatory technique that will 
harness private sector innovation without tradeoffs, that will avoid hard 
normative choices, or that can make everyone happy at once. The 
regulation of financial sector innovation in recent years in no way 
counts as successful if what we care about is transparency, 
accountability, or the bending of the arc of private innovation toward 
greater social benefit than the market can produce on its own. I hope 
that thinking about financial regulation in terms of its innovation-
framing qualities will help us chart a clearer path forward. 
 
